Takhar - Program for Culture and Conflict Studies

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Takhar Data - Content

Takhar Province

Governor: Santatullah Temori

Population Estimate: 933,700

Area in Square Kilometers: 12,333

Capital: Taloqan

Districts: Hazar Samuch, Baharak, Khwaja Ghar, Bangi, Eshkamesh,  Chal, Namak Ab,  Farkhar, Kalafgan, Rustaq, Chahab, Yangi Qala, Khwaja Bahawuddin, Darqad, Dasht Qala, Warsaj.

Ethnic Groups: Uzbek, Tajik, Pashtun/Kuchi, Hazaras.

Religious Groups: Sunni, Shi'a, Ismaili Shi'a.

Occupation of Population: Agriculture, Trade and Services, Non-Farm labor, Animal Husbandry, and some Illicit Drug Industry, Remittances, Manufacturing.

Crops/Livestock: 53% Fruit and Trees, 12% Grapes and Produce such as Vegetables, Potatoes, Beans and Alfalfa, Clover or other Fodder, 12% Wheat; Cattle, Donkey, Goats, Sheep, and Chickens.

Literacy Rate: 16%1

Total # of Educational Institutions: 269 Primary and Secondary Schools.2

Colleges/Universities: The University Abdullah ibn Masoud Takhar, which has faculties of Medicine, Agriculture, Religious Law, Literature and Training & Education. There is also a Teacher Training Institute.

Active NGOs in the Province: AKDN, ACTED, ARE, Association for Aid and Relief-Japan, CAF, Concern Worldwide (Taloquan), MSH, Mission East, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Relief International, Terre des Hommes, National Solidarity Programme/Programme Management Unit (NSP/PMU).

Transportation: 43.1% of roads in the province are able to take car traffic in all seasons, and 29.1% able to take car traffic in some seasons.

Estimated Population with Access to Electricity: 5% of households in Takhar province have access to electricity. Access to electricity is much greater in the urban area where 16% of households have access to electricity, while this is true for only 2% of rural households.

Hospitals: 4

Clinics: 33

Pharmacies: 71

Sources/Availability of Drinking Water: Less than 29% of households use safe drinking water.

Electricity: 5% of households in Takhar province have access to electricity. Access to electricity is much greater in the urban area where 16% of households have access to electricity, while this is true for only 2% of rural households.

Rivers: Panjshir.

Topographical Features: Half of Takhar is considered mountains or semi-mountainous and the remaining land is flat.

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Takhar - Content

Takhar Provincial Review

Takhar province was established in 1964 when Qataghan Province was divided into three provinces: Baghlan, Kunduz and Takhar. Taluqan (Taloqan), the capital of Takhar, is located in northern Afghanistan with the 2006 estimated population of 196,400 people.

Takhar has coal reserves of fairly good quality which are being exploited by hand in some villages and sold in the region. The local population considers gold the most relevant resource for the Province. Gold is being washed in Takhar River, and about 2kgs are being transported to the specific weekly markets in the city of Taluqan. The city is also a main source of construction materials like: loam, sand, and different types of stones. Takhar province is known for its salt mountains and you can find large deposits of fine salt in the region. The Takcha Khanna salt mine is one of the growing number of salt supplier, for the population of Takhar and northern Afghanistan. While the mines offer economic opportunities in the region, the availability of iodized salt considerably reduces the prevalence of health problems related to iodine deficiency.

Takhar Governor

 

The current governor for the Takhar province is Yasin Zia, an ethnic Tajik. Zia has served in various positions in Afghanistan's government, to include as the head of the Afghanistan Counter-Terrorism Unit and Operational Deputy of the National Directorate of Security. Since taking office, Zia has personally engaged in addressing corruption and violence in his district. In 2016, Zia reportedly disguised himself to catch two attorneys suspected of taking bribes to free prisoners in custody.11 

Taliban Shadow Governor: Qari Aminullah12 

 

 

 

 

Takhar Map

 

Human Terrain

Tajiks

The Tajik are the largest ethnic group in Badghis Province. They are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns and comprise between 25-30% of the Afghan population. The Tajiks in Afghanistan tend to live in settled communities as opposed to a nomadic lifestyle. Pashtuns refer to them as Farsiwan, or speakers of Farsi, the lingua franca of Afghanistan (50% of Afghanistan speaks Farsi, as opposed to only 35% for Pashtu). Between the Tajiks and Pashtuns there has been significant animosity in recent years. Forming the backbone of the Northern Alliance, they also have a base in the nation of Tajikistan. They held out fiercely against the Taliban. Most Tajik are Sunni Muslims, but a few are Shi’a. Tajiks made up the majority of the Northern Alliance, both in terms of membership and leadership. Tribal ties have largely broken down among the Tajiks; therefore, social organization is defined primarily by geography. Despite their lack of cohesiveness the Tajiks are often brought together due to the perceived common threat posed by the Pashtuns.3 View the Tajik Tribal Tree

Pashtuns

Durrani Pashtuns are located primarily in Mughab and Ghormach Districts of Badghis Province. The largest single ethnicity of Afghanistan, the Pashtun, and in particular the largest tribe of Said, the Ghilzai, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Traditionally beholden to the moral code of Pashtunwali (“the way of the Pashtun”), they can easily be deeply offended by breaches of the code and carry the grudge for generations. The Pashtuns are fiercely independent and often view themselves, as the largest ethnicity in the country, as the rightful leaders of Afghanistan. That being said, they suffered much during the Soviet invasion, and must be included in any effort to secure and develop the country. Pashtuns in Ab-Kamari District have reported that they are under-represented politically and are often suffer extortion at the hands of individuals claiming to be government representatives.4

Durrani

The Durrani constitute the dominant Pashtun tribe, and the one from which leaders of Afghanistan are traditionally drawn. Their origin is uncertain, but their likely foundation occurred in the mountains of Ghor. In 1747, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Durrani confederation displaced the Ghilzai confederation from the Kandahar region into the mountainous areas along the eastern afghan border. The current Afghan regime under President Kharzai is represented disproportionately by men of Durrani lineage. View the Durrani Tribal Tree

Hazara

The Hazara, a distinct ethnic and religious group within the population of Afghanistan; they have often been the target of discriminatory and violent repression. Most likely descended from the Mongols of Genghis Khan, (there is also a strong argument that they are of Eastern Turkic origin), the Hazara are noticeably different in physical appearance when compared to the Pashtun majority. In terms of religion, the vast majority of the Hazara are of the Shi’a Muslim faith, again in contrast to the Pashtuns who are Sunni Muslim. Due to these differences, “the Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan.5 As the traditional underclass of Afghan society, Hazara were exploited and made to work as servants and laborers. As a result, there tends to be an anti-government and anti-Pashtun bias among the Hazara. In present day Afghanistan, the Hazara are divided geographically into two main groups: the Hazarajat Hazara and those who live outside the Hazarajat. The Hazarajat is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan and is “centered on Bamiyan province and include[s] areas of Ghowr, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Ghazni province.6

The Hazara living outside of the Hazarajat live in and around Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Samangan province. Due to atrocities committed against them by the Taliban, the Hazara by and large are opposed to the Taliban. In August 1998, the Taliban massacred approximately 4,000 Hazara in Mazara-e Sharif; this massacre was followed by another the next month when the Taliban killed another 500 Hazara in Bamiyan. The Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) is an umbrella political organization which commands the support of large numbers of Hazara. The Hazara are also often at odds with the Kuchi population within the Hazarajat. The Hazara of Badghis reside in the western reaches of the province. View the Hazara Tribal Tree

Baluch

The Baluch, thought to number over a million in Afghanistan, are an Indo-Iranian ethnic group spread over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Significant numbers also exist abroad. In Pakistan, Baluchi independence groups have fought with Islamabad over the revenues from natural resources in Baluchistan. The capital of Pakistani Baluchistan is Quetta, where many of the Taliban are thought to have fled after their fall from power, but Kalat, further south, has traditionally been the seat of the Baluch Khans. The Baluch are overwhelmingly but not entirely Sunni Muslims. Their power-structures, based on the khan, are generally perceived to be more concentrated than those of the more fractious Pashtuns. In Afghanistan they are primarily nomadic, roaming the southernmost districts of the three southernmost provinces with small numbers present in Badghis Province.

Aimak

The Aimak are a Persian-speaking nomadic or semi-nomadic tribe of mixed Iranian and Mongolian descent who inhabit the north and north-west highlands of Afghanistan and the Khorasan Province of Iran.7 They are closely related to the Hazara, and to some degree the Tajiks. They live in western Hazarajat in the provinces of Ghor, Farah, Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Jowzjan and Sar-e Pol. The term Aimak derives from the Mongolian term for tribe (Aimag). They were originally known as chahar or (the four) Eimaks, because there were four principal tribes: the Taimani (the predominating element in the population of Ghor), the Ferozkhoi, the Temuri, and the Jamshidi. Estimates of the Aimak population vary between 250,000 and 2 million. They are Sunni Muslims, in contrast to the Hazara, who are Shiahs. The best estimates of the Aimak population in Afghanistan hover around 1-2 million. The tally is made difficult since, as a consequence of centuries of oppression of the Hazara people in Afghanistan, some Aimagh Hazaras are classified by the state as Tajik, or Persian instead of Aimaks.

Chanar

The Chanar Aimaqs are believed to be of Turco-Mongolian origin. This assessment is based on their physical appearance and the style of dwellings they utilize which closely resemble Mongolian style yurts. The Chanar speak a Persian dialect (Dari) unlike their Turco-Mongolian kinsmen in other areas.8 The Chanar Aimak population of Badghis is dominant throughout the southern half of the province.

 

Political Parties

Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan)9

The Islamic Society of Afghanistan is reported to have approximately 60,000 supporters in Northern Afghanistan. The party is led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, previously president of the Islamic State. Other key figures are Abdul Hafez Mansur and Munawar Hasan. It is predominately a Tajik political party which was active in the anti-Soviet jihad and a major political player in the Northern Alliance. Today Rabbani supports Karzai. Yunus Qanuni’s Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween is a splinter group of Jamiat-e Islami. At least three of the District Governors of Badghis Province are members of Jamiat-e-Islami.

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)10

This mujahideen party has been active since the Soviet invasion; and is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It is actively opposed to US-led and Afghan national forces and is politically active in neighboring Herat Province. Hekmatyar is a Kharoti Ghilzai and, therefore, less influential among other religious and ethnic groups in the provinces of northwestern Afghanistan, particularly the Shi’a. Hekmatyar issued a letter to Pajhwok Afghan News in June 2008 threatening to launch attacks in northern Afghanistan, including Badghis and Baghlan provinces.

Hizb-i Wahdat (Mohaqqeq)

The Shiite umbrella party, Hizb-I Wahdat is composed of seven of the eight Shiite parties (minus the Harakat-e Islami) that existed in Afghanistan from the time of the anti-Soviet campaigns. Now led by Wolesi Jirga member (and former planning minister) Hajji Muhammad Mohaqqeq, the party continues to represent both Shiites and Hazaras. During the period of Taliban rule, the party held fast in the Hazarajat whilst the Taliban tried through blockade to bring the Hazaras to their knees through starvation.

Islamic Council of Herat

The Islamic Council of Herat, which consists of scholars, religious figures, independent civic foundations and non-government bodies is a loose conglomeration created to voice concerns, particularly security issues, which they feel the provincial government is not adequately addressing. The commercial ties between Qalay-i-Naw and Herat may serve as a conduit for the Council's influence in Badghis as infrastructure improves linking the two provinces.

 

General Security Landscape

Badghis was the first northern province to be seized by the Taliban in late 2006. Even after their official takeover of the province, the largely Uzbek and Turkmen population of the province resisted the rule of the Pashtun Taliban. The province was quickly retaken by Northern Alliance forces during the opening days of OEF, which was followed by a brutal cleansing of the Pashtun minority in the province. Iran provided significant aid to Northern Alliance forces in Badghis during the campaign against the Taliban.

Various influential warlords have traded control of the province since the fall of the Taliban regime including: Abdul Malik, Rashid Dostum, Juma Khan and Ismail Khan. Independent warlords still exert considerable influence within Badghis in the by running private jails, seizing land, and controlling the opium poppy harvest. The province has been relatively peaceful since the fall of the Taliban, despite periodic conflicts between rival warlords.

The PRT in Bagdis is led by Spain and based in the capital city of Qalay-i-Naw. Since 2005, the Taliban has sought to infiltrate the isolated northwestern provinces of Badghis and Faryab, both of which have small Pashtun enclaves. Badghis province has become one of the Taliban’s gateways into the north. It is plausible that Taliban infiltration routes mirror the geographical area dominated by the Pashtun of Badghis in the northern region of the Province.

Security in the Pashtun dominated districts of Ghormach and Murghab has deteriorated significantly since 2006. Roadside bombs, ambushes and large scale raids with up to 300 Taliban fighters has become common. ISAF along with ANA units have launched a series of security operations in northern Badghis to help quell the rising tide of insurgent violence.

 

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References - Menu

Image of The Governor is from Alchetron.

1 Afghan Ministry of Rural Development and Rehabilitation, Provincial Profile, 2005.

2 Afghan Ministry of Rural Development and Rehabilitation, Provincial Profile, 2005.

3 2007 CIA World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, at Link.

4 Afghan Information Management Services, Badghis District Profiles, at Link.

5 US State Department Afghanistan Culture and Ethnic Studies, 2004.

6 Ibid.

7 Janata, A. "AYM?Q". Encyclopædia Iranica. Ed. Ehsan Yarshater. United States: Columbia University.

8 ."Afghanistan". Encyclopedia Britannica. Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008.

9 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Country Fact Sheet
AFGHANISTAN, at Link.

10 Chris Mason, Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz.

11 Afghan Bios, at Link; Link.

12 Khaama Press, at Link.

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