



Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars

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ABSTRACT

Why do rebels kill each other? When confronting a formidable regime, rebels often descend into warring factionalism rather than forge unity across their ranks to reap the advantages of cooperation. This article tackles the puzzle of inter-rebel fratricide. It explores power and resource competition arguments, and contrasts them with ideological mechanisms that can drive inter-rebel violence. It argues that ideological extremity is central to rebel fratricide. Rebel organizations with common ideological origins can still compete with each other based on their degree of centrism and extremism, making them ideologically distant. This *proximity-distance paradox* makes their cohabitation mutually threatening. Ideological challengers from the same family tree are particularly threatening to one's group cohesion, and if successful, guarantee one's political marginalization within the broader movement. Extremist groups are likely to respond to these threats with fratricide, while ideologically centrist ones will rely on other strategies such as balancing, outbidding, or defecting to manage their rivalries. Algeria's civil war, 1992–2002, is a plausibility probe case study that illustrates these causal mechanisms. The study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the role of ideology in armed civil conflicts.

KEYWORDS

Algeria; civil conflicts; civil wars; ideology; rebel fragmentation

Introduction

Insurgencies and civil wars reveal an interesting paradox. Rebels facing a formidable regime often opt to fight each other rather than forge unity across their ranks to oppose their common adversary. Unity is believed to improve rebels' fighting capabilities, making them difficult to defeat. When cooperation is institutionalized in formal alliances between several major groups with joint command and control over military operations, it increases the rebels' odds of success.¹ Conversely, infighting consumes lives and resources, enables incumbent regimes to deploy "divide and conquer" strategies, and sometimes prompts rebel defections to the state.² Warring factions often end up in protracted conflicts with no victory in sight, or end up negotiating outcomes that usually fall short of their movement's initial goals.³ Yet, despite the risks and costs associated with disunity, rebels often choose competition over cooperation, and even descend into internecine conflicts. The history of insurgencies and civil wars is replete with episodes of inter-rebel violence,⁴ leading one expert to conclude that "a revolutionary's worst enemy is

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often another revolutionary.”⁵ How can we explain this paradox? Why do rebels kill each other instead of reaching a *modus vivendi* that allows them to stay focused on the ultimate prize of toppling the regime?

This study outlines several ideological mechanisms that drive inter-rebel conflicts, and contrasts them with power and resource competition arguments. It argues that rebel fratricide is most likely to emerge when rival factions that are competing for the same constituency perceive their irreconcilable ideological divides as a major threat to their factional survival. Ideological organizations from the same family tree (e.g., communists, nationalists, or fundamentalists) can still splinter between extremists and centrists.⁶ Their ideological proximity based on their common intellectual heritage makes them credible voices to movement fighters, supporters, and sponsors. Yet their ideological distance on key conflict issues means that their disagreements can divide their fighters, followers, and sponsors between two viable alternatives. This *proximity-distance paradox*—proxidistant for short—produces two threats that unleash an impulse to suppress ideological rivals: a threat to *intra-factional cohesion*, which could produce defections to a rival faction, and a threat of *inter-factional marginalization*, where the success of a rival produces a direct loss to one’s faction (i.e., a zero-sum game).

The argument goes one step further. Fearing defections and marginalization, factions can undertake a number of strategies to mitigate these dual threats, including balancing, outbidding, spoiling, defecting, and fighting. This study hypothesizes that *only* ideologically extreme factions will contemplate fratricide to address threats emanating from factional competition, while ideologically centrist ones will opt for strategies that fall short of aggressively killing their rivals. Extremists are more attuned to ideological distance than centrists, they are more prone to belief superiority than their counterparts, and their extremism in other domains engenders a permissive ideational structure for violence against fellow rebels.

It is important to note at the outset that what makes one faction extreme and another centrist is determined independently of inter-rebel fratricide—they are exogenous to violent infighting. The centrism-extremism divide is measured along three dimensions: *conflict framing*, *conflict objectives*, and *targeting policies*. When rebels emerge to fight an incumbent regime, some adopt extreme narratives, objectives, and targeting policies, while others adopt less hawkish discourses, goals, and repertoires of violence. These factions compete with each other on the basis of their divergent ideological positions. At a certain point, one faction—the one that began with an extremist worldview—chooses to eliminate its rivals instead of simply compete with them. Thus, terms like centrists and extremists in this study are not used tautologically, but determined before the onset of inter-rebel fratricide.

The Algerian civil war, which took place between 1992 and 2002, is a plausibility probe case study that illustrates these theoretical claims through a rich, analytically descriptive account of factional conflicts, carefully tracing the process by which ideological cleavages facilitated fratricide. Algeria’s “black decade,” as it came to be known, featured intense factional competition and eventually fratricidal violence within the Islamist movement, mainly between the Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique Armé*, GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Army (*Armée Islamique du Salut*, AIS). Combining primary and secondary sources, and publicly available interviews with insurgent leaders that laid down their arms following the 1999–2000 government amnesty, this article highlights the direct role ideology played in

structuring the rebel movement into competing armed factions and driving inter-rebel violence between its extremists and centrist groups. The ideological argument is tested in relation to competing hypotheses, principally power and resource competition.

The article proceeds in four sections. First, it introduces the conceptual context surrounding the phenomenon of competitive factionalism and outlines four ways in which rebels can compete with each other that fall short of infighting. The next section presents competing resource, power, and ideological hypotheses that can explain the dependent variable of fratricidal violence, outlining their causal mechanisms in the process. The third section presents a detailed narrative of warring factionalism in Algeria's civil war, and highlights how the proximity-distance paradox contributed to inter-rebel fratricide. It also assesses the competing power distribution and resource competition hypotheses in light of the Algerian case study. The article concludes with a summary of its theoretical contribution and suggests research extensions.

The spectrum of competitive factionalism

Rebels often constitute rival factions that compete with each other through *balancing*,⁷ *spoiling*,⁸ *defecting*,⁹ and *outbidding*.¹⁰ Given the range of options available to rebels to manage their rivalries, why do some turn to fratricide? Few have taken on this puzzle directly.¹¹ Fratricide involves rebels violently intimidating or coercing rivals, but in its most extreme form involves the extermination of rival leaders, fighters, organizations, and their supportive constituencies.¹² Its underlying purpose is to monopolize power, maximize decision-making autonomy, remove potential spoilers, and minimize the need to share post-conflict spoils with competitors. Rebel fratricide, therefore, is qualitatively distinct from other forms of competitive factionalism because it is intended to kill other rebels, not just compete with them. To amplify this distinction, it is useful to summarize the many forms of factional competition in terms of their objectives, causal drivers, and common outcomes (see [Table 1](#)).

Balancing

Multiparty civil wars constitute anarchic environments where no overarching authority can enforce binding commitments and protect rebels from predation at the hands of rival armed groups. Factions have to mind their own survival and interests by enhancing their relative power vis-à-vis rivals. Balancing is one strategy to ensure that a rival faction does not become too dominant in the rebel movement. Rebel groups could aggregate their capabilities to balance against the forces of a rival faction, precluding the latter from threatening their survival or interests. Balancing arises in accordance with the logic of minimum winning coalitions—ones with sufficient aggregate power to win the conflict, but with as few partners as possible to maximize one's share of postwar political spoils.¹³ Because power realignments occur frequently in civil wars, alliances are highly unstable. The quest for minimum winning coalitions can generate endless side switching to maintain a delicate balance of power.

Spoiling

A rebel faction often competes with its rival by intentionally undermining its ability to act as the sole legitimate representative of the movement in conflict-ending negotiations. For

Table 1. Forms of competitive factionalism in fragmented civil conflicts.

Form	Objective(s)	Causal Driver(s)	Outcome(s)
Balancing	Prevent rivals from monopolizing power by pursuing minimum winning coalitions	Anarchy produces credible commitments problems, resulting in concerns for relative power	Movement divided into balanced coalitions, but side switching and opportunistic alliances are frequent
Spoiling	Undermine the ability of rivals to negotiate conflict-ending settlements	Negotiation process elevates one faction above its rivals, threatening their ability to claim representation of their shared constituency	Sabotaged negotiations, protracted conflicts, and competition among rival factions over movement leadership
Outbidding	Seek leadership of the rebel movement or greater “market share” of public support by differentiating one’s faction from rivals	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demand by supporters for punishing violence against the opposing side in the conflict• State repression of established movement leadership creates an opportunity for new factions to seek leadership of the movement	Escalation of violence by rival factions directed against the incumbent regime or its constituent publics; non-violent competition between factions through the provision of public goods
Defecting	Seek support from an incumbent regime or flip to a rival faction against one’s former allies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic and material enticement by state or rival factions• Fratricide by rivals invites protection-seeking behavior	Cease rebellious activities and switch loyalties to the incumbent regime to help bring about an end to the rebellion, or switch loyalties to rival factions
Fratricide	Intimidate, coerce, or eliminate rival factions by force	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Resource competition• Power asymmetry• Ideological distance	Rebel infighting, intra-organizational purges, and mass violence against supporters of rival factions

rebel groups that aspire to take the lead in the future representation of their national constituency, the negotiation process can grant them recognition, legitimacy, and concessions.¹⁴ Spoiling the process, therefore, deprives them of this opportunity. Spoiling occurs in at least two ways. Rebels can produce *timely* violence to signal to the incumbent regime that its rebel interlocutor lacks the ability to control the movement and, therefore, that it should not trust in its ability to deliver on its end of the bargain.¹⁵ Rebels can also spoil negotiations through *escalatory* violence that radicalizes the opposing side in a conflict and invites reprisal attacks against one’s own constituency. This dynamic of rebel aggression and retaliatory state violence makes it difficult for rebel negotiators to conclude a peace deal because their constituent publics will be less inclined toward peace.¹⁶ Like balancing, spoiling is intended to undermine rivals, not fight with them or eliminate them directly.

Outbidding

Outbidding is a form of competitive factionalism intended to address the issue of who can best represent the interests of the rebel constituency and achieve its objectives.¹⁷ Rebel factions compete with each other by making the case that they alone can deliver the public goods desired by the rebel movement and its supporters. Outbidding among rival groups can work in two ways. In situations where opposing communities in a civil conflict are polarized and demand punishing violence against out-groups, rebel factions can compete

with each other by delivering attacks that are qualitatively and quantitatively superior to their rivals' attacks. In doing so, they increase their popularity within their communities, which in turn produces greater legitimacy, recruits, and resources.¹⁸ Rebels can also compete with rivals by distinguishing themselves through the provision of public goods to their supportive constituencies.¹⁹ Outbidding could be triggered by another mechanism. Regime repression can remove the established political leadership of a contentious movement, triggering competition for succession within the movement. An emergent rebel group can rise from obscurity and ascend the leadership hierarchy ladder by escalating violence against an incumbent regime to demonstrate its superior commitment to the cause.²⁰

Defecting

Defection in the context of inter-rebel competition entails groups abandoning their factional allies and, instead, switching to fight for factions against which they previously competed. This form of side switching is rampant in multiethnic patrimonial political systems, where the state is failing and the need to secure material resources is of paramount concern. Rebels prioritize their economic survival above in-group loyalty or rebel victory. Local leaders commanding armed men switch sides as new patrons make themselves available through the provision of cash payments, weapons, salaried positions, or control over the flow of humanitarian aid, among other material rewards.²¹

Staniland offers another mechanism that leads to defection.²² He argues that the predatory conduct of hegemonic rebel factions toward weak groups precipitates protection-seeking behavior in the form of defections. Rebel groups fearing elimination in a two-front war with the incumbent regime and the dominant insurgent group will choose to defect to the state. The "fratricidal flipping" theory offered by Staniland treats rebel fratricide as the causal (independent) variable, and defection as the outcome (dependent variable). He does not seek to explain the origins of fratricidal violence, but assumes it and proceeds to explain its effect on ethnic defection.

This study is interested in fratricide as the dependent variable and wants to explore its underlying causes. The aforementioned theories address rebel fragmentation and competition, but they do not address directly the question of why rebels initiate fratricidal violence against their fellow rebels. The following section offers competing resource, power, and ideological hypotheses to explain inter-rebel violence.

Competing explanations of fratricidal rebellions

Inter-rebel fratricide is highly controversial and carries many risks. A predatory rebel faction risks delegitimation if it cannot justify its fratricide to its ardent supporters, and rationalize it within the broader rebel movement. It also runs the risk of diverting valuable material and human resources while also engaging in battle with an incumbent regime. It goes without saying that it is an extremely dangerous endeavor that can result in failure, or at least protracted factional wars. Therefore, it is necessary to theorize the conditions that lead some rebel groups to undertake the leap from competition to fratricide.

Power and resource competition

Fjelde and Nilsson maintain that power considerations, contextualized in the political economy of violence, incentivize rebel infighting.²³ Rebels require economic and financial resources to sustain their organizations, enhance their relative power in the face of rival factions, and build political leverage against incumbent regimes. Therefore, economic considerations are of utmost significance in rebellious movements and will invariably drive inter-rebel competition and conflict.

Factional infighting over economic resources is likely to manifest in contexts where the government is weak, giving rebels space to prioritize their rivalries above their security. If the regime is relatively strong, rebel groups have to mind their security first and foremost, and may need other factions to aggregate capabilities to ward off regime offensives. But when the regime is weak or virtually non-existent, rebels can afford to take risks to enhance their relative power position at the expense of their rivals.

Infighting is also likely when the distribution of power between rival factions is asymmetric because equally matched factions deter aggression. Fjelde and Nilsson argue that while strong groups are better positioned to eliminate their rivals, weak groups have an incentive to initiate fighting as well because, if successful, their payoff is quite high. The implication is that power asymmetry—unequal distribution of capabilities—would be most conducive to rebel infighting.

Finally, infighting is likely in rebel-controlled territories with “easily extractable and valuable natural resources, such as diamonds, oil, drugs, and other contraband.”²⁴ Control over those resources can translate into rebel power. Under these scope conditions, territorial control becomes a higher priority for rebels than fighting against the incumbent regime.

The power and resource competition theory yields the following expectations for the Algerian case study:

Hypothesis 1: Rebel fratricide emerges when rebels feel confident about their ability to ward off regime offensives and ultimately defeat the regime.

Hypothesis 2: Imbalance of power between rival rebel factions is a precondition for fratricide, with the greater likelihood that strong factions will seek to eliminate the weak ones.

Hypothesis 3: Rebel fratricide will most likely be concentrated in resource-rich regions where economic control translates into military and political power.

Ideology as an alternative explanation

Rebel groups are not just divided by their power capabilities; they are also fragmented along their ideological preferences. Most often, the rift is quite clear, as in secular-religious divide, ethno-sectarian divides, or loyalists-separatists splits. Stark ideological differences can violate deeply held normative commitments and create mutual mistrust about the future intentions of rival rebels. Indeed, ideologically distant groups are likely to view

conflict between them as inevitable, increasing the likelihood of competition and conflict during the course of the civil war.

Less clear, however, are movements that are ideologically connected yet deeply divided on core conflict issues such as who is the primary enemy, who are the legitimate targets of the civil war, and what are the ultimate objectives of the struggle. Ideological movements are heterogeneous despite their neat categorization under labels of nationalists, socialists, separatists, or fundamentalists. As DeNardo observed sardonically over three decades ago, “factional debates seem like preposterous exercises in ideological hairsplitting, only to be dismissed as window dressing for clashes of personality, struggles for power, or some other essentially personal or accidental process.”²⁵ In reality, they can turn ideologically proximate groups into bitter enemies, despite their shared intellectual genealogy and utopian visions.

The proximity-distance paradox (proxidistant for short) can be operationalized along three dimensions: conflict framing, conflict objectives, and targeting portfolios.²⁶ Ideological divergence along the three dimensions yields a *centrist-extremist divide* in kindred movements. Table 2 captures these differences.

Conflict framing refers to how factions construct a shared understanding of the civil conflict in which they are active participants. It answers three basic questions: who are we, why are we fighting, and whom are we fighting against? Conflict framing is intended to diagnose the causes of the crisis, attribute blame for its perpetuation, and activate political identities for collective action.²⁷ In doing so, it constructs one’s primary in-group in relation to a threatening out-group.²⁸ Threat attribution can be narrowly cast against a specific leader, a coterie of elites, and a set of policies, or it can encompass the entire political order, its institutions, and all its laws, representatives, and supporters. Centrists opt for nuanced conflict framing that recognizes the complexity of competing political actors and their preferences, while extremists promote a Manichean (“us vs. them”) narrative of the conflict.

Conflict objectives answer the question, what are we fighting for? Ideologically proximate groups can diverge on the ideological-strategic question of limited versus total war, or system integration versus system transformation. Rebels pursuing system transformative objectives seek the overthrow of the state and the radical refashioning of the polity by elevating new institutions, elites, and policies. Proponents of system transformation usually portray extant state institutions as irrevocably corrupt, inherently illegitimate—even heretical—and simply beyond reform. Participation in these institutions results in movement cooptation and outright corruption of its leaders.²⁹ Integrationist rebels, on the other hand, do not necessarily wish to transform existing state institutions but rather

Table 2. Ideological distance between extremists and centrists.

Ideological Dimension	Extremists	Centrists
Conflict Framing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manichean (“us vs. them”) • Out-group homogenization (“they are all the same”) • Out-group demonization (“they are all evil”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuanced and multiplex • Differentiates opponents by degrees of culpability for conflict onset and perpetuation
Conflict Objectives	Total war for system transformation	Limited war for system integration
Targeting Portfolio	Expansive and indiscriminate	Bounded and selective

remove obstacles to their inclusion and participation in those institutions. In other words, the conflict is about reforming the polity through corrective policies and new political actors, not the revolutionary transformation of the state. Centrists are open to system integration while extremists insist on system transformation.

Targeting portfolios answer the question, what are the legitimate targets of our struggle? While targeting is usually a tactical or strategic issue, it can be ideological if certain categories of people are deemed to be enemies by the mere fact that they represent a detested out-group excluded from the “universe of obligation.”³⁰ Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood find that ideology is critically important in producing two distinct outcomes in civil wars: mass killing and controlled violence.³¹ This is consistent with findings by Costalli and Ruggeri in Italy’s civil war (1943–1945),³² Thaler in Mozambique’s and Angola’s wars of independence,³³ and Goodwin in South Africa.³⁴ Out-group homogenization and dehumanization are the usual mechanisms by which such violence is rationalized.³⁵ Centrists insist on controlled and selective violence, while extremists are inclined to use expansive and indiscriminate violence.

Ideological challengers along the centrist-extremist divide threaten *intra-factional cohesion*, which could produce mass defections, and raise the prospect of *inter-factional marginalization*, which could undermine the political aspirations of the factional leaders. These dual threats, in turn, set the stage for competition, conflict, and fratricide.

Ideological challengers as threats to intra-factional cohesion

Rebel organizations require ideological cohesion to be effective, especially if rebels lack sufficient economic resources to pay for leadership allegiance and incentivize rebellion.³⁶ Ideology can help bind rebels to their leadership, motivate commitment and sacrifice, remove inhibitions to violence, and reprioritize collective incentives above personal aspirations. That is why insurgent organizations from diverse traditions—Marxists, Maoists, ethnonationalists, and Islamists—dedicate time and resources to socialize their recruits ideologically.³⁷

Proxidistant ideological challengers can undermine factional cohesion through two mechanisms. When a rival rebel group with overlapping ideological precepts frames the conflict in ways that challenge one’s own framing of the conflict, not only does it violate the group’s normative commitments and political preferences, it also presents a challenge to intra-group fidelity. Truly distant ideological rivals—ones with little in common with one’s factional ideology—are less threatening to intra-group cohesion than rivals from the same ideological family tree. Really distant factions are not seen as credible alternatives to one’s supportive constituency, fighters, and funding sources. However, this is not the case with rivals who share one’s values, ideals, and intellectual origins. The possibility of an alternative framing of the conflict from a credible rival could encourage internal dissension and produce defections, which threaten to delegitimize the leadership of a rebel group and draw away valuable cadres and material resources.³⁸ Groups, therefore, have an incentive to engage in boundary policing³⁹ in order to maintain intra-factional unity and foreclose opportunities for defections. This leads to the prediction that:

Hypothesis 4: Rebel fratricide is likely to emerge among ideologically proximate groups that nonetheless have diametrically opposed framing of the conflict.

The second mechanism relates to the difference between centrist and extremist targeting. Extremist rebel groups that engage in indiscriminate violence are likely to encounter critiques from centrist rebels that oppose such violence on ethical or strategic grounds.⁴⁰ Critiques from ideologically proximate rivals can undermine the legitimacy of indiscriminate tactics and the leaders who deploy them. Such critiques can call into question the moral foundations of the group's leadership, casting doubt on its authority to lead the movement. Silencing critics becomes a necessary condition for anticipating internal leadership challenges and maintaining intra-group unity in the face of external agitation. This leads to the prediction that:

Hypothesis 5: Rebel fratricide is likely to emerge among ideologically proximate groups that nonetheless have diametrically opposed targeting portfolios.

Ideological challengers as threats to inter-factional marginalization

When ideologically proximate factions pursue diametrically opposed conflict goals—system integration versus system transformation—the success of one faction can translate into the political marginalization of the other. Revolutionaries are not interested in maintaining the existing order, and they usually advance new leaders from outside the established reform-minded opposition, thus threatening the future of centrist leadership. On the other hand, the success of centrists in pursuing system integration usually entails the suppression of its radical periphery, thus threatening the extremist leadership. The mutual exclusivity of rebel conflict goals becomes a zero-sum competition that could invite rebel conflict and fratricide. This leads to the following prediction:

Hypothesis 6: Rebel fratricide is likely to emerge among groups with diametrically opposed conflict objectives.

Ideological extremity and differential responses to factional threats

Not all rebel groups respond to threat perceptions in the same way. Extremist factions are more likely than centrist ones to deploy fratricide when threatened by proxidistant ideological challengers. Four reasons help explain why that is the case. Ideologically extreme individuals are much more attuned to the presence of ideological distance, which is to say they have a tendency “to perceive greater distance between competing political alternatives” than those that are less extreme.⁴¹ Additionally, ideologically extreme individuals, regardless of political content, are more prone to “belief superiority” than centrist ones, which in turn is associated with the tendency toward belief rigidity or “non-corruptibility.”⁴² Relatedly, ideologically extreme individuals have been shown to be more intolerant of divergent political beliefs than those who are ideologically less extreme.⁴³ Individuals with extreme beliefs also exhibit a greater preference for certainty

than centrist individuals, and high levels of uncertainty are associated with a high sense of threat.⁴⁴ Lastly, ideologically extreme groups with revolutionary goals are likely to have developed a permissive ideational structure, or what Leader Maynard terms “permissive moral logic,”⁴⁵ to justify mass violence toward the regime and civilians that stand in the way of their transformative project. This ideational scaffolding can be used to dispatch rebels who are not adhering to ideological dogma. All this leads to the prediction:

Hypothesis 7: Extremist factions are more likely to respond violently to proxidistant ideological challengers than centrist factions.

The Algerian civil war during the 1990s featured a fratricidal war between the GIA and AIS, as well as intra-GIA bloodletting. It culminated with massacres against civilians loyal to the AIS and those that split from the GIA. The case is intended as a plausibility probe of the ideological mechanisms leading to inter-rebel violence, and provides an opportunity to assess the power and resource competition hypotheses as well.

Algeria’s civil war, 1992–2002

In 1989, Algeria embarked on major political and institutional reforms in the aftermath of mass anti-state riots in the previous year. A new constitution officially ended the one-party system, opening a path for liberal and Islamist opposition groups to directly challenge the historic monopoly of the ruling National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN). Islamists took advantage of this opportunity by forming the Islamic Salvation Front (*Front Islamique du Salut*, FIS) party.

After a landslide victory for the FIS at municipal and provincial elections in June 1990, other Islamist parties began to emerge, including the Islamic Society Movement (*Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami*, HAMAS) and the Islamic Renaissance Movement (*Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique*, MNI). Along with official Islamist parties emerged a number of small groups with an extremist orientation that opposed electoral participation.⁴⁶ These would later form the nucleus of the GIA. These diverse groups, organizations, and parties populated the Islamist factional landscape and they competed for the loyalty of the entire Islamist field. They included *Salafists*, *Muslim Brothers*, *Djaz’ara*, and Algerian “Afghans.” Table 3 briefly describes these factions.

The FIS initially submerged some of these tendencies into its front and managed to win 188 out of 430 national assembly seats in the first round of voting in December 1991. It was poised to win an overwhelming majority of seats in the second round of voting set for January 1992, but Algeria’s generals intervened to halt the electoral process. They forced President Chadli Benjedid to resign and declared a state of emergency. They also dissolved the FIS and a military court sentenced its two leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, to 12 years in prison. Thousands of FIS cadres were rounded up and detained as well. State repression and Islamist insurgency marked the beginning of the “black decade.” Some estimate the death toll in the civil war to be as high as 200,000—6,000–18,000 persons had disappeared as well.⁴⁷

Competitive factionalism after state repression, 1992–1994

The ideological cleavages that were submerged within the FIS were unleashed in the armed movement. Several rebel groups emerged along the lines of pre-war ideological

Table 3. Pre-civil war ideological cleavages.

Ideological Strand	Description
Salafists	Believe Muslims should be ruled by an Islamic state organized according to the precepts of the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna), and the formative Islamic generations, or the righteous forefathers (<i>al-Salaf al-Salih</i>). They also believe that Islamic law (<i>sharia</i>) is a set of religious, social, and economic rules that should be applied in every Muslim society across the ages. They reject Western norms and mores, and reject the institution of democracy. While they are not entirely opposed to political activism and parliamentary participation, they view these strategies as an extension of their <i>dawa</i> (religious preaching) work, and they run the risk of fermenting <i>hizbiyya</i> (partisan party politics that unduly divides Muslims). Some pragmatic Salafists, however, have relaxed these precepts to allow for political participation in order to Islamize secular institutions.
Muslim Brotherhood	Represented by HAMAS in Algeria during the period under consideration, the Muslim Brotherhood is a conservative political integrationist movement that insists on legalism, gradualism, and constitutionalism. As such, it believes in democratic participation and political accommodation with the state, even as it works to establish an Islamic polity. When political avenues are closed, it retreats to civic activism and <i>dawa</i> work, thus rejecting the use of violence against the state.
Djaz'ara	Literally meaning Algerianists, this tendency rejects the dogma of contemporary Salafists, especially their belief that Islamic law can be applied in the same manner across the Muslim world—hence the title Algerianists. It is closer to the Islamic “modernists,” especially the Algerian Islamist philosopher Malek Bennabi (1905–73), who held that Islam must be reinterpreted in light of historical transformations and must be adapted to different national contexts. ¹⁰² The Djaz'ara, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, alternated between clandestine activism and overt participation in electoral democracy. This strand came to dominate the FIS leadership after June 1991, and is detested by the Salafists.
Jihadi Salafists	Similar to Salafists in many ways, except they insist that a singular focus on preaching is insufficient to bring about an Islamic state, and reject any form of parliamentary participation. Militant activism is necessary given the resources of the modern secular state and its power to forestall the rise of a genuine Islamic polity. Preparing for violence is an imperative because of the inevitability of confrontation with the secular order.
“Algerian Afghans”	While not an ideological strand <i>per se</i> , the “Afghans” generally gravitated toward Jihadi Salafist and other extremist tendencies. The term refers to hundreds of Algerians who volunteered to join the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Many of these “Afghans” returned to Algeria during the political liberalization phase, and they subsequently played a prominent role in forming the armed movement after the coup, especially the GIA.

divides. Some Arab Afghans and Jihadi Salafists joined the Islamic State Movement (*Mouvement pour L'état Islamique*, MEI), but many flocked to the GIA. The Djaz'ara strand formed the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (*Front Islamique pour le Jihad Armé*, FIDA), and other FIS activists operated under the label of the Armed Islamic Movement (*Mouvement Islamique Armé*, MIA).⁴⁸ Other groups formed during the course of the rebellion as well. Table 4 lists the major factions that appeared between 1992 and 2002.

A major turning point in the rebellion came in May 1994. Several notable leaders that were part of the FIS during the electoral phase agreed to join the GIA. Muhammad Said, Abderrazak Rejjam, and Yousuf Boubras came as representatives of the FIS Provisional National Executive Bureau (which later became FIS's post-coup “crisis cell”).⁴⁹ The May 1994 merger also included Said Makhloufi, a former FIS leader who had formed the MEI in 1992. This unification was a major blow to the centrist wing of the FIS, which up to this point was concentrated in the MIA. The emergence of the GIA, and consolidation under its banner, marked the ascendancy of the revolutionaries and marginalization of the pragmatists within the Islamist movement.

Table 4. Major insurgent factions in Algeria's civil war, 1992–2002.

Rebel Faction	Acronym	Year Formed	Founding Leader	Ideological Strand	Merger/Split/Demise
Mouvement Islamique Armé	MIA	1992	Abdelkader Chabouti	Salafist	Became AIS in 1994
Mouvement pour L'état Islamique	MEI	1992	Said Mekhloufi	Jihadi Salafist and Afghans	Merged with the GIA in 1994, but split from GIA shortly after
Front Islamique pour le Jihad Armé	FIDA	1992	Abdelwahab Laamara	Djaz'ara	Merged with GIA in 1994; purged from GIA in 1995
Groupe Islamique Armé	GIA	1992	Abdelhaq Layada	Jihadi Salafist	Split in 1998 into the GIA and GSPC; ceased to exist by 2004
Armée Islamique du Salut	AIS	1994	Madani Mezraq	Salafist and Djaz'ara	Agreed to ceasefire and amnesty between 1997 and 2000
Ligue Islamique pour Da'wa and Jihad	LIDD	1997	Ali Benhadjar	Djaz'ara	Agreed to join AIS ceasefire and amnesty by 2000
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat	GSPC	1998	Hassan Hattab	Jihadi Salafist	Continued to fight the Algerian regime and became Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007

Cherif Gousmi, the commander of the GIA at the time of unification, based the merger on strict ideological boundaries. All the parties involved had to adhere to the Salafist tradition and abandon any doctrinal “innovations” (i.e., Djaz'ara beliefs).⁵⁰ The GIA also refused any unity with the political wing of the FIS and made it clear that it was not its armed wing.⁵¹ Despite symbolically appointing Abassi and Belhaj to its consultative council, the GIA unequivocally opposed the electoral strategy of the FIS and insisted that any unity with the latter had to be based on a renunciation of elections, parliaments, and democracy.⁵² The unification communiqué declared that “the GIA is the only legitimate organization for *jihad* in Algeria” and “all *mujahedeen* must join the GIA.”⁵³

Confronted with the possibility of losing leadership over the rebel movement, the FIS opted to balance against the GIA. Field commanders loyal to the FIS in the western and eastern regions rejected the May 1994 unification under the banner of the GIA; they formed the AIS instead. The AIS officially declared Abassi and Belhadj as their political leaders, and the FIS as its political movement. It also declared Madani Mezraq the national commander of the AIS. The latter was clear in his intention to balance against the newly hegemonic faction, which threatened to marginalize the FIS by “melting” it within the GIA. According to Mezraq, after the defection of the only remaining free FIS leaders to the GIA, the FIS “amounted to nothing more than a small faction under the umbrella of the GIA and its leader Abu Abdullah [Cherif] Gousmi.”⁵⁴

The AIS quickly moved to regain FIS's hegemony in the Islamist movement. It issued a number of open letters in which it denounced the expansive violence of the GIA and called upon armed groups to rally behind the FIS and its armed wing. In one letter, Madani Mezraq urged fighters to join the AIS to wage a jihad that is legitimate, with clear contours and limited objectives. He also urged them to beware of those suspicious elements that easily denounce Muslims as infidels without religious foundations or credible evidence. In an implicit criticism of GIA's increasingly daring attacks, he reminded his audience that jihad is not suicide, revenge, adventurism, anarchy, or blind zeal. In another letter that condemns violence against civilians, he states, “we fight among men, we do not kill the old, women or children.”⁵⁵ This direct challenge of GIA's targeting

portfolio and claim to leadership was clearly intended to offer the AIS as an alternative faction.

Ideological demarcations between the GIA and AIS

The GIA and AIS advanced diametrically opposed conflict framing, conflict objectives, and targeting policies. These divergences were rooted in an ideological divide as to the role of democracy in Islam, the permissibility of Islamists joining secular political systems, and the centrality of violence in building an Islamic state. Table 5 summarizes the main ideological divides between the two factions.

It is important to highlight that these ideological divisions pre-dated the civil war (see the aforementioned Table 3); they were not endogenous to their fratricidal conflicts. Many of the individuals that formed the GIA previously refused to participate within FIS's party apparatus during the electoral phase. Moreover, they refused to form a unified rebel movement with other FIS leaders once the civil war broke out, insisting on their own rebel formation.⁵⁶ It was only after they established themselves by 1994 that they agreed to absorb former FIS leaders into their faction, insisting that they renounce the FIS and join as individuals, not as representatives of other armed groups. Thus, rather than being endogenous to the emergence of the AIS, GIA's extremity was present from the outset.

From the start of the civil war, the GIA promoted conflict frames that portrayed the Algerian state as a tyrannical apostate regime, and its supporters and employees as equally culpable in perpetuating apostasy. Jamal Zitouni, the fifth GIA leader, maintained in his 1995 tract *The Guidance of the Lord* that "the [GIA] considers the institutions of the (Algerian) state, from its agencies and ministers, to its courts and legislative and parliamentary assemblies, to its army, gendarme and police, to be apostate institutions."⁵⁷ It rejected the possibility of negotiations or reconciliation with moderate regime elements that were interested in ending the crisis, and instead raised the mantra of "no dialogue, no ceasefire, no reconciliation, and no security or guarantees with the apostate regime."⁵⁸ It also denied the possibility of neutrality in the conflict, and treated security forces and public workers as part and parcel of the apostate order. In sum, the GIA advanced a total war conflict frame and insisted on system transformation, not reintegration into the electoral process. In contrast, FIS's leadership on the eve of repression was solidly behind the electoral process and rejected violence as a means to establish an Islamic state. Its armed wing, the AIS, similarly insisted that the struggle was between a hawkish faction

Table 5. Ideological differences between the GIA and AIS.

Ideological Dimension	GIA	AIS
Conflict Framing	Religious war borne out of a secular order in which an apostate regime rules over Muslims with man-made laws. The entire system is heretical	Political crisis provoked by an extreme military faction that subverted the democratic process and contravened the will of the people
Conflict Objectives	Total war for system transformation and the creation of an Islamic State through jihad. No negotiations or compromise with an apostate regime	Limited war for system reintegration and return to the electoral process through a negotiated political settlement
Targeting Portfolio	Any individual who works for the Algerian state; economic and educational infrastructure; journalists; foreigners; secular intellectuals; civilians; France	Limited to the Algerian security forces and government officials associated with the coup

within the regime that opposed a just political settlement and Islamists who were deprived the fruits of their electoral victories. The AIS did not view the war in terms of apostasy, and rarely averred that all who work with the Algerian state are enemies of the movement. It sought to reintegrate Islamists into the political process, and did not insist on the complete transformation of the Algerian state into a theocratic one.

The GIA believed democracy is heresy, and jihad was inevitable because secular rulers would never relinquish power without a fight.⁵⁹ Although the coup was the impetus for the armed movement, the leaders of the GIA did not refer to the coup to justify their jihad. On the contrary, the literature of the GIA rarely mentioned it or did so only to deny that it motivated its insurgency. For example, an August 1993 communiqué by the third GIA commander, Jafar al-Afghani (an Algerian “Afghan”), clarified that “the Armed Islamic Group was not born today; it was in secret preparation for years, but its entry into open jihadist military operations was precisely a year and 10 months ago, that is since the Guemmar operation [less than two months prior to the coup].”⁶⁰ The refusal of the GIA to use the coup as its justification for armed struggle is logical in light of its rejection of the electoral process and democracy.

In contrast, Madani Mezraq, AIS’s general commander, explained years later that “we fought on the basis of two principles: a return to the legitimate political process and respect for the choice of the Algerian people.”⁶¹ The AIS portrayed its jihad as a struggle against a self-interested elite who put an end to an otherwise legitimate process. They wanted a return to the system that briefly came into being and was subverted by the putschists.

In addition to divergent conflict framing, the GIA and AIS were also completely opposed on conflict objectives and targeting policies. The GIA waged a total war to induce the collapse of the regime.⁶² Violence initially took the form of clashes with security forces and assassinations of policemen and military personnel. In 1993, its violence began to expand to include government officials—especially those who were members of the quasi-parliamentary National Consultative Council and the National Transition Council. Violence then expanded to include representatives of opposition groups, foreigners and, shortly after, journalists and intellectuals. However, since 1995 the victims of violence were mainly civilians, killed randomly through bombings or deliberately through indiscriminate attacks in villages, markets, cafés, and fake checkpoints.

The GIA also sought to undermine the economic foundations of the state and disrupt the day-to-day functioning of the government. Between 1995 and 1998 there were approximately 5,400 sabotage operations. The gas and electric company reported 722 acts of sabotage while the post and telephone communications infrastructures suffered 434 attacks. Roads and bridges—260 of them—were not spared acts of sabotage.⁶³ The GIA threatened state employees because they enabled the day-to-day functioning of the regime. It began to execute them, often at fake security checkpoints where those identified as state workers were simply shot, hacked to death, or had their throats slit. Schools and school workers were constant targets from 1992 onwards.⁶⁴

In contrast to the expansive violence of the GIA, the AIS limited its violence to security forces and government officials.⁶⁵ The AIS opposed and denounced attacks on intellectuals, foreigners, and anyone who was not directly involved in the persecution of Islamists because such violence discredited the image of the movement and played into the hands of the “eradicationists” within the regime. Thus, rather than seek to outbid the GIA with escalatory violence, the AIS sought to differentiate itself by insisting on targeted violence

in self-defense against a regime that overturned the choice of the people and turned to violent repression against a legitimate, legal party.⁶⁶

Threat perceptions, boundary hardening, and fratricidal violence

The biggest beneficiaries of the 1992 coup were the Jihadi Salafis who were completely marginalized within the broader Islamist movement during the electoral phase. Political participation sidelined them because of their ideological opposition to *hizbiyya* (partisan divides among Muslims) and democracy, and because they could not compete with established leaders whose activism goes as far back as the 1960s. The coup presented them with a golden opportunity to remake the Islamist movement in their own image, as their main competitors were either in prison, exile, or members within their organization. As one GIA commander stated plainly in the May 1994 unification meetings, “The FIS is to be credited for bringing the masses to this point, for which we are grateful, but it is unable to continue the march because of its limitations. It put too much emphasis on the political (electoral) strategy without ever having prepared for the jihad that was on the horizon. We are the ones who first sacrificed [during 1992–1994] and we have proven our ability to lead.”⁶⁷

The palpable sense of ascendancy was diminished by the creation of the AIS in July 1994, and its insistence on a negotiated settlement with the regime as opposed to waging total war to establish an Islamic state by force. The AIS wanted to restore the pre-civil war equilibrium in which radicals were subordinate to the historic leadership of the Islamist movement. In a telling interview, Madani Mezraq, AIS’s general commander, betrayed his disdain for the GIA’s upstart leadership:

The AIS was made up of known leaders who were part of the preachers’ movement (*haraka da’awiyya*) that later became responsible representatives and leaders within the FIS... The GIA, on the other hand, was not a well-integrated movement. It had many factions, Bouyalists [rebels from an earlier period] ... and takfiris [those who excommunicate Muslims] full of a virulent form of Salafism that denounced governments and people, and even us, as infidels... It was a cocktail of factions.⁶⁸

Interestingly, ‘Asem Abi Hayan, a former GIA commander who went on to become a leading *sharia* official within Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), also shares this assessment of the GIA. When asked what explains the deviation of the GIA, he gives two reasons:

- (1) Its poor socialization in Islamic law and ethics, as well as its extreme religious positions based on a misapprehension of Islamic scripture.
- (2) The presence of many doctrinal viewpoints within a single group, which created mistrust among the people of competing perspectives and the instinct to eliminate them from the field.⁶⁹

GIA’s expansive violence against Algerian civilians intensified criticism of its legitimacy, leading many Algerian Islamists to aver publicly that the GIA was an arm of the Algerian intelligence services. Thus, critics of indiscriminate violence threatened to delegitimize GIA’s leadership.

As a result, the GIA struck back by denouncing their critics, demanding they cease their criticism of the “jihad.” Open war between the GIA and AIS began on May 4, 1995, when the former issued a communiqué declaring that AIS leaders have a month to get in touch with the GIA to repent and join its ranks.⁷⁰ Shortly after, the GIA issued an explicit threat against eight FIS leaders demanding they cease speaking in the name of the Islamist movement.⁷¹ Finally, on June 13, 1995, the GIA issued communiqué #36, entitled “An Open Letter to Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj,” in which it symbolically ousted the two imprisoned leaders from its consultative council and permitted “the shedding of the blood of those ‘blood merchants’ inside and outside (Algeria) unless they repent.”⁷²

The AIS initially avoided organizing in GIA’s main areas of operation, for fear of sparking confrontation. As FIS leader Abderlkarim Ghamati explained, “the AIS formed an initial organization of approximately 50 individuals in the middle, but the [GIA] threatened to kill them. [Therefore,] we decided not to open the door of battle with [the GIA].”⁷³ Azzedin Ba’a, one of the leaders of the MEI who refused to unify ranks with the GIA in May 1994, was killed by the latter in June 1995.⁷⁴ The following month, the GIA executed one of the original founders of the FIS, Abedlbaqi Sahroui, in a Paris mosque. Two of the FIS leaders who defected to the GIA in May 1994, Abdelrazak Rejjam and Yousuf Boubras, withdrew their groups from the GIA in 1995 after accusing the latter of justifying the killing of the innocent.⁷⁵ In November 1995, the GIA executed Rejjam and Muhammad Said (both prominent FIS leaders, and known preachers, associated with the Djaz’ara faction that joined the GIA in May 1994).⁷⁶ These executions were not isolated leadership purges. There were repeated reports in 1995 of clashes between the GIA and AIS, resulting in the death of approximately 60 militants.⁷⁷ After a series of warnings and threats, the GIA explicitly declared war on the AIS on January 4, 1996.⁷⁸ Later that month, sources close to the FIS Executive Body Abroad (under Rabeh Kebir) accused the GIA of slaying 140 FIS activists, including 40 commanders.⁷⁹

The GIA under Zitouni and his successor Antar Zouabri also engaged in intense boundary hardening that further polarized the armed movement.⁸⁰ When GIA leaders feared that some of the latecomers to their faction were not committed to their Salafist worldview and total war objectives, they began to purge them from the organization. In Zitouni’s tract, *The Guidance of the Lord*, he rejected any alliance with groups such as *Hizb al-Tahrir* and the *Takfir wal Hijra*, both of whom are considered radical groups by any standard. In the same year, the GIA executed approximately 100 “*takfiris*” allegedly for transgressions against civilians.⁸¹ These attempts at boundary policing proved counter-productive as many militias opted to split from the GIA, and ordinary citizens who previously were sympathetic to the Islamist cause defected to state paramilitary militias.⁸²

As other groups within the GIA expressed their dissent, they were purged and punished. Mustapha Karatali, the commander of al-Rahman militia in the Larbaa region, accused the GIA leader of massacring relatives of the militia at fake checkpoints. The break began when the GIA issued an order to target the families of police and security forces. After refusing to abide by this order, Zitouni sought to insert new militias into the Larbaa region, a move rejected by Karatali. He explained the reason for splitting from the GIA in the following terms: “We fled (to the mountains) to die as a persecuted people not as persecutors or perpetrators of killing the innocent.”⁸³

GIA’s fratricidal violence—against former supporters and rival rebels—reached stupefying levels in a series of massacres that began to take place at the end of 1996. In response

to rebel defections and the rise of pro-government paramilitary militias (officially known as the *Groupes de Légitime Défense*, commonly referred to as “Patriots”), the GIA unleashed massacres to impose their authority in their strongholds as well as punish those who had taken up arms against them.⁸⁴ At least 76 massacres took place between November 1996 and July 2001, most of which were in 1997 (42 massacres). Massacres were concentrated in villages around Algiers, Blida and Medea (south of Algiers), Ain Defla (southwest of Algiers), and Relizane (west of Algiers). All these were within the GIA’s areas of operation.⁸⁵

One massacre targeted GIA’s former allies who had defected to form the Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad (*Ligue Islamique pour Da’wa and Djihad*, LIDD). In Ktiten village in al-Medea province, the GIA went after the extended family of Ali Benhadjar, LIDD’s commander, “who was coordinating with the AIS and whose group assassinated Zitouni, the GIA Emir, in 1996.”⁸⁶ In another massacre in Bentalha, the GIA targeted relatives of AIS fighters belonging to Zone Six fighters and their commander Awad Bou Abdullah.⁸⁷

In 1997, the AIS essentially defected to the state. It agreed to call for a ceasefire without any substantial concessions from the regime, and even engaged in operations to clear out the GIA from AIS’s stronghold in the Jijel mountains with state support.⁸⁸ The AIS saw indiscriminate violence as a threat to its political project and declared a unilateral ceasefire to avoid a two-front war with the regime and the GIA. Given that the AIS never justified its struggle against the state in religious terms, and once it became clear that armed struggle was damaging Islamists’ standing with the public, it made little sense to continue with the insurgency. The AIS was created to offer an alternative to total war and as a way to force the government to negotiate a settlement with the FIS. Once it became clear that the armed struggle was not serving this aim, the AIS quit the fight.

Assessing the resource and power explanations

The previous discussion highlights the centrality of ideological divides in structuring the rebel movement into competing armed factions as well as producing conflict and eventually fratricide between the two dominant factions. It demonstrates through detailed process tracing how a direct challenge from a proxidistant ideological group produced threats to intra-factional cohesion and fears of inter-factional marginalization. The AIS chose to deal with those threats through balancing and (later) defecting, whereas the GIA opted for intimidation and fratricide. These divergent responses to threat perceptions suggests that organizational attributes such as the degree of extremism matter in producing divergent outcomes. It is reasonable to assert, therefore, that the Algerian case demonstrates the feasibility of hypotheses 4–7.

The power and resource competition hypotheses (1–3) seem to have limited explanatory power in the Algerian case study. The first hypothesis expects rebel fratricide to emerge when rebel groups feel confident about their ability to ward off regime offensives. Less concerned about their security, rebel factions can prioritize enhancing their relative power at the expense of their rivals. This hypothesis is not borne out in Algeria. Sustained rebel fratricide began in 1995, peaked in 1997, and diminished after 1998. Most experts on Algeria treat this period (1995–1998) as one of government recovery, especially after the November 1995 elections, which produced a large voter turnout despite death threats from the GIA.⁸⁹ The total rebel force in 1995 is estimated at 10,000–28,000 militants.⁹⁰

The Algerian military had about 140,000 troops in 1994 and augmented that force with another 150,000 local militias by 1997.⁹¹ In 1995, it had an elite anti-guerrilla corps made up of 60,000 army, gendarmerie, and police personnel.⁹² The Algerian state was also spending 4.6% of its GDP on defense expenditures, which was up from 1.7% in the mid-1980s.⁹³ With the help of France, it was able to renegotiate with the IMF new terms to service its debt obligations and acquire a much-needed loan to prosecute the war.⁹⁴ The French authorities were also supplying the Algerian state with valuable intelligence and cracking down on GIA networks in France.⁹⁵ Lastly, by 1995, the Algerian regime had managed to kill or capture three successive GIA national leaders. There is little evidence therefore that the rebels were confident in their ability to ward off state offensives prior to the commencement of fratricidal violence.

The second hypothesis expects that an imbalance of power between rebel factions will invite fratricide, with the greater likelihood that the strong faction will seek to eliminate the weaker ones. Estimating the “power” of a rebel group is tricky, but if we simply look at the size of the GIA and AIS between 1994–1995 and 1998–2000—i.e., the period of rebel fratricide—we will see that both factions were roughly balanced during this timeframe. Table 6 offers the range of available estimates.

One can argue that the GIA had a greater sense of power because it included seasoned fighters by way of the “Algerian Afghans” and because the unification of rebels under its banner in May 1994 made it abundantly clear that it was the predominant faction in the civil war, which is what prompted the formation of the AIS as a balancing force. The GIA also had support from the emerging Al Qaeda transnational network, including fighters from nearby Libya.⁹⁶ However, the GIA also began to experience splits due to its controversial violence and undertook internal purges in 1995–1996, which is right before the peak of fratricidal infighting and massacres. Therefore, the evidence for hypothesis 2 is tenuous at best. It is based on a subjective overestimation of GIA’s own capabilities rather than an objective reading of the balance of forces in the insurgent field.

The third hypothesis expects that rebel fratricide will mainly revolve around control over the war economy and, therefore, fighting will be concentrated in resource-rich regions where economic control translates into military and political power. On this point, the evidence from the Algerian case is mixed at best. According to Hagelstein, most of the violence in Algeria was concentrated in the Algiers-Boumerdes urban area in the northern central part of the country. The Meftah and the Chrea mountains in Blida province were GIA strongholds, while the “areas around Lakhdaria, Zharbar (Bouira), the Ouarsenis mountains (Tissemsilt), Collo (Skikda), and the Chekfa mountains (Jijel)” were AIS areas.⁹⁷ These offered a complex topography and dense forestry, which were ideal for hiding,

Table 6. Rebel size estimates as measure of power.

Rebel Faction	Low-High Estimates 1994–1995		Low-High Estimates 1998–2001	
	Low	High	Low	High
GIA	2,000 ¹⁰³	5,000 ¹⁰⁴	5,000 ¹⁰⁵	6,800 ¹⁰⁶
AIS	4,000 ¹⁰⁷	8,000 ¹⁰⁸	4,800 ¹⁰⁹	6,000 ¹¹⁰

but were also close to major urban population centers where militants concentrated much of their violence. However, Algeria's main hydrocarbon fields are located in the thinly populated eastern and southern regions of the country, well out of the rebels' reach at the height of the insurgency. Given that more than 90% of Algeria's export revenues are derived from hydrocarbons, the military allocated a force of 45,000 men to secure these facilities from insurgent attacks.⁹⁸

This does not mean that rebels did not compete for resources and territory. Martinez details how rebels sought control over strategic and secondary roads with high commercial vehicle traffic that could be confiscated or taxed, and he highlights how extortion rackets were an important source of revenue for competing rebel commanders and criminal upstarts pretending to be jihadists.⁹⁹ Yet Martinez stops short of claiming that the GIA-AIS competition was purely about territorial control. Rebel economic predation seemed more about individual social advancement than group conflicts.

More generally, the resource conflict argument raises more puzzles than it answers in the Algerian case. First, why did the centrist AIS (or MIA before it) not initiate violence against the GIA if it was equally interested in establishing a monopoly over the war economy? The fratricide in Algeria appears to be unidirectional with the extremist GIA doing most of the predatory attacks. Additionally, why did the GIA engage in intra-organizational purges against factions that merged with it when it could have channeled those forces to take territory from the AIS? These purges led to defections that ultimately weakened the GIA in its competition with the AIS.

Conclusion

Ali Benhadjar, a former GIA commander who split to form the LIDD in 1997, summarized the fault lines dividing the GIA from his group and the AIS: "We would have preferred political means if our rights had been respected. Our armed struggle was in self-defense. For the GIA, the only true struggle was the armed struggle. Anything else was *haram* [forbidden in Islam]."¹⁰⁰

This insider's assessment, and many others cited earlier, does not accord with the prevailing theorizing on rebel fragmentation and infighting, which treats ideological divides as endogenous to competition over material resources and the distribution of power. This study is a corrective on the curious neglect of ideology in factionalized civil wars, and a modest contribution to a burgeoning body of scholarship that seeks to bring back politics and ideology in the study of civil wars.¹⁰¹ It argues that ideology matters in structuring rebel factionalism, in generating competitive dynamics among rebels, and in producing infighting. It introduces the paradox of proxidistant factions, i.e., ones that are ideologically proximate in origins and ultimate objectives, but ideologically distant on key conflict issues.

The Algerian civil war offers substantiating evidence that the ideological divergence between rebel factions along three dimensions—conflict framing, conflict objectives, and targeting policy—threatens intra-group cohesion and heightens fears of group marginalization. However, the Algerian case also shows that not all factions respond to these dual threats with fratricide. Ideologically centrist groups like the AIS will opt to balance against their rivals, whereas ideologically extreme groups like the GIA are more likely to respond to threats by engaging in the external suppression of their rivals. Extremists have in place

the permissive ideational structure for rebel fratricide because of their polarizing conflict frames, system transformation objectives, and indiscriminate targeting policy.

These differences suggest that future research on fragmented conflicts should take seriously the role of ideas and factional politics in explaining inter-rebel dynamics. Investigating organizational attributes, not just the structural conditions that invite competition and conflict, are necessary to better understand who is likely to initiate fratricide and who is likely to adopt less extreme forms of competition. For example, how might the magnitude of internal factionalism within a rebel organization heighten sensitivity to the presence of ideological competitors in the rebel movement? Also, how does one disentangle personal or idiosyncratic leadership qualities from ideological considerations in rebel fratricide? Interestingly, in the Algerian case, the actors involved placed tremendous explanatory power on the poor ideological socialization of GIA's younger leadership and the introduction of ideologically extreme worldviews into its leadership hierarchy.

Asserting the centrality of ideology in fratricidal practices does not negate the role of "need and greed" in conflict dynamics; future research could benefit from an integration of "need, creed, and greed" variables. Competition over resources and the distribution of power within a rebel movement are important permissive material structures for fragmentation and infighting, but many rebel groups avoid the trap of fratricide even though they confront the same power asymmetries and resource conflicts as those who do succumb to warring factionalism. Differential outcomes under the same structural opportunities and constraints suggest that unit level or dyadic level variables are also important for a complete and compelling explanation of rebel fratricide.

Disclosure statement

The author reports no conflicts of interest. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of the article.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on the draft manuscript, as well as the Department of National Security Affairs Research Connections Colloquium participants for their constructive suggestions on how best to frame the study's main theoretical argument: Naazneen Barma, Erik Dahl, Michael Glosny, Jessica Piombo, Rachel Sigman, and Chris Twomey. I also wish to thank Victor Asal, Emily Gade, and Zachary Shore for commenting on earlier drafts.

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23. Fjelde and Nilsson (see note 11).
24. Fjelde and Nilsson (see note 11), 609.
25. DeNardo (see note 6), 105.

26. The concepts of conflict frames and targeting portfolios come from the work of Michael Gabbay and Ashley Thirkill-Mackelprang, "A Quantitative Analysis of Insurgent Frames, Claims, and Networks in Iraq," *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Paper*, August 2011. I am indebted to Gabbay and Emily Gade, co-collaborators on other research projects, for shaping my thinking on these issues.
27. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–39.
28. For two recent and compelling empirical works on threat framing in civil conflicts, see Scott Strauss, *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), and Anastasia Shesterinina, "Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 3 (2016): 411–27.
29. The Shinning Path based its opposition to the moderate, democratic left on the logic of institutional cooptation. See James Ron, "Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (2001): 569–92. Similarly, jihadists in Egypt during the 1990s denounced the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in parliament on similar fears of institutional corruption. See Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 51.
30. Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," in Alexander Hinton, ed., *Genocide: An Anthropological Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 84.
31. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 217. Others have also found that ideological socialization can constrain anti-civilian killings and rape in civil wars. See Amelia Hoover Green, "The Commander's Dilemma: Creating and Controlling Armed Group Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (2016): 619–32.
32. Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, "Indignation, Ideologies, and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943–45," *International Security* 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 119–57.
33. Kai M. Thaler, "Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola," *Civil Wars* 14, no. 4 (2012): 546–67.
34. Jeff Goodwin, "'The Struggle Made Me a Nonracist': Why There Was so Little Terrorism in the Anti-Apartheid Struggle," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review* 12, no. 2 (2007): 193–203.
35. Omar Shahabudin McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the Rwandan Genocide," *International Security* 37, no. 2 (2012): 119–55; Jonathan Leader Maynard, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014): 821–41.
36. Scott Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 111–30.
37. Ben Oppenheim, Abbey Steele, Juan F. Vargas, and Michael Weintraub, "True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 799.
38. It is possible that truly cohesive rebel organizations with a long history of camaraderie could be strengthened by an external challenger, as would be predicted by Social Identity Theory. This will not be the case for newly formed rebel groups in a competitive landscape, or ones with many internal factions and leadership blocs dispersed across several regions.
39. For more on the process of boundary activation or boundary policing, see McDoom (see note 35), and Adrienne LeBas, "Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe," *Comparative Politics* 38, no. 4 (2006): 419–38. The best example of boundary policing is the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Beginning in 1985, LTTE waged an offensive against its four big former coalition partners, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). By 1987, the LTTE became the dominant rebel organization fighting for Tamil secession in Jaffna until its complete defeat in 2009. The LTTE established an internal intelligence and surveillance network to identify potential defectors in

its ranks, and liquidated rival fighters and members of the Tamil community for presumably exhibiting disloyal tendencies that endangered the revolutionary struggle. Boundary policing was institutionalized as a legitimate organizational practice and ideologically justified as a revolutionary ideal. See Sharika Thiranagama, "In Praise of Traitors: Intimacy, Betrayal, and the Sri Lankan Tamil Community," in *Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy, and the Ethics of State-Building*, edited by Sharika Thiranagama and Tobias Kelly (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010): 127–49.

40. It is possible that centrists can exploit the "radical flank" effect to position themselves as an alternative to radicals in negotiations with an incumbent regime (Lichbach, see note 5, 209–10). However, in order for this centrist strategy to work, eventually moderates must rebuke extremists and demonstrate that they can marginalize them in exchange for meaningful concessions, which is why extremists are wary of proxidistant rivals that can sell them out (Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace," see note 8, 265).
41. Donald Granberg and Thad A. Brown, "The Perception of Ideological Distance," *The Western Political Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (September 1992): 746.
42. Kaitlin Toner, Mark R. Leary, Michael W. Asher, and Katrina P. Jongman-Sereno, "Feeling Superior Is a Bipartisan Issue: Extremity (Not Direction) of Political Views Predicts Perceived Belief Superiority," *Psychological Science* 24 (2013): 2454–62; Mark J. Brandt, Anthony M. Evans, and Jarret T. Crawford, "The Unthinkable or Confident Extremist? Political Extremists Are More Likely Than Moderates to Reject Experimenter-Generated Anchors," *Psychology Science* Volume 26, no. 2 (2015): 189–202.
43. Markus Kemmelmeier, "Political Conservatism, Rigidity, and Dogmatism in American Foreign Policy Officials: The 1966 Mennis Data," *Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied* 141, no. 1 (2007): 77–90; Becky L. Choma, Carolyn L. Hafer, Jane Dywan, Sid J. Segalowitz, and Michael A. Busseri, "Political Liberalism and Political Conservatism: Functionally Independent?," *Personality and Individual Differences* 53 (2012): 431–6.
44. John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway, "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition," *Psychological Bulletin* 129, no. 3 (2003): 339–75; and Jeff Greenberg and Eva Jonas, "Psychological Motives and Political Orientation—The Left, the Right, and the Right: Comment on Jost et al. (2003)," *Psychological Bulletin* 129, no. 3 (2003): 376–82.
45. Leader Maynard (see note 35), 832.
46. Séverine Labat, *Les Islamistes algériens: entre les urnes et le maquis* (Paris: Seuil, 1995); Michael Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1996); and Camille Tawil, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Musalaha fi al-Jazair: min al-Inqadh ila al-Jama'a* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998).
47. Abdellah Cheballah, "Algeria Reconciliation Proves Elusive Decade after Deal," *L'Agence France-Presse* (AFP), September 28, 2015.
48. Tawil (see note 46), 59–62 and 107–8.
49. For the complete video featuring GIA leaders with the FIS and other leaders during the unification meeting in the mountains, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQKLeAY1e7s> (accessed February 3, 2016).
50. The inclusion of representatives of the Djaz'ara tendency—Muhammad Said, Abderrazak Rejjam, and Yousuf Boubras—under the banner of the GIA posed a problem to some of the participants. According to Omar Chikhi, one of the original nine founders of the GIA, "the Djaz'ara was a group that could not be trusted." He goes on to say, "Gousmi felt that the unification of the ranks and the enrollment of men like Muhammad Said, who enjoyed notoriety and credibility, would attract a wider popular base of support for the GIA. . . . Gradually, he managed to persuade the reluctant GIA cadres who questioned the wisdom of this unification with the Djaz'ara." He persuaded them by insisting that they were joining the GIA as individuals, not as part of another armed group. See *al-Majallah* (London), January 21, 2001 (part 2).
51. Madani Mezraq, the national commander of the AIS, maintains that several attempts were made in 1992 and 1993 to bring the GIA and other groups together to form a unified armed movement under the leadership of the FIS, but the GIA did not respond to these initiatives. Instead, "we began to hear claims that it is not appropriate to fight under the banner of

- parties, and the FIS should change its name because it contains opportunists.” See *al-Hayat*, July 26, 1996.
52. Similar to the inclusion of the Djaz’ara, the symbolic inclusion of Abbasi and Belhaj in the consultative council also produced controversy within the GIA. According to Chikhi (see note 50), Gousmi wanted to force the FIS leadership into the military arena by linking them to the GIA. He wanted to signal the end of the division between politicians and militarists. The two had to become one.
 53. Tawil (see note 46), 152.
 54. Listen to part one of a three-part radio interview conducted by Nouredine Khababa with Madani Mezraq on March 18, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYOHp2dCBEM> (accessed February 3, 2016).
 55. The letters were issued in March and April 1995 and cited in Tawil (see note 46), 298–99 and 303–4.
 56. According to Chikhi (see note 51), Jafar al-Afghani, the second GIA leader, once told him that “they [FIS leaders] are driving us crazy with this talk about the unification of ranks. . . . However, the divergence in viewpoints among the various currents blocked our efforts for unification.”
 57. The complete title is *Hidayat Rab al-‘Alamin fi Tabyeen Usul al-Salafiyeen wama Yajib min al-Ahd ala al-Mujahedeen* (The Guidance of the Lord of the Universe in Clarifying the Traditions of the Forefathers and the Requirements of Allegiance among the Holy Fighters). It is a 62-page pamphlet carrying the name Abu Abdel Rahman Amin and dated 27 Rabi’a al-Thani 1416/1995. Quotation from p. 27.
 58. Ibid.
 59. According to Chikhi, Abdelhaq Layada, the GIA’s first general commander, rejected calls for fighting for a political process. Chikhi states, “differences started to surface between the political leadership of the FIS and the commander of the Group [GIA] over the strategy that they should adopt. The politicians would suggest using political means to overcome the crisis and regarded armed action as a ‘pressure tool’ . . . but Abdelhaq Layada responded by saying the solution can only be achieved by armed action.” See *al-Majallah* (London), January 14, 2001 (part 1).
 60. See *al-Hayat*, August 27, 1993. The attack on the Guemmar army barracks on the Algerian-Tunisian border in November 1991 was led by an Algerian “Afghan” named Abderrahmane Abu Siham, and was presumably intended to capture arms.
 61. Listen to part one of a three-part radio interview conducted by Nouredine Khababa with Madani Mezraq on March 18, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYOHp2dCBEM> (accessed February 3, 2016).
 62. According to Chikhi (see note 50), “the basic principle was one, namely, escalation until the fall of the authority.”
 63. See *al-Hayat*, September 4, 1999.
 64. Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 950 schools were sabotaged. See *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, July 26, 1995.
 65. Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 198–206.
 66. See, for example, FIS’s *El-Ribat* bulletin on August 2, 1995, published by its supporters in Europe, in which it condemns GIA’s deviation that led to attacks on owners of gas stations and foreigners. Quoted in *Al-Hayat*, August 3, 1995.
 67. For the complete video featuring GIA leaders in discussion with FIS’s and other leaders during the unification meeting in the mountains, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQKLeAY1e7s> (accessed February 4, 2016).
 68. Listen to part one of a three-part radio interview conducted by Nouredine Khababa with Madani Mezraq on March 18, 2012. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYOHp2dCBEM> (accessed February 4, 2016).
 69. See *Interview with Sheikh ‘Asem Abi Hayan: The Historical Milestones of the Jihad in Algeria*, September 2016. <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/ifricc84qicc84yyah-al-muslimah->

- 22dialogue-with-acc84scca3im-abucc84-hcca3ayacc84n-plants-from-the-history-of-jihacc84d-in-algeria22.pdf (accessed June 7, 2017).
70. See *al-Ansar*, newsletter no. 96, May 12, 1995. This is a London-based GIA publication.
 71. See *al-Hayat*, May 10, 1995.
 72. See *al-Ansar*, newsletter no. 101, June 15, 1995.
 73. Interview with Ghamati in Tawil (see note 46), 174.
 74. The GIA claimed responsibility for his execution in *al-Ansar*, newsletter no. 113, September 7, 1995.
 75. See their communiqué in *al-Hayat*, July 5, 1995.
 76. After initially denying the deed, the GIA sent a two-hour videotaped “confession” of Abdelwahab Lamara, commander of FIDA before merging with the GIA in 1994, and former commander of the GIA, Mahfouz Tajeen (Abu Khalil) by his side. In the video, Lamara describes how Said and others sought on several occasions to take over the leadership of the GIA. In the last attempt, they conspired with Tajeen to oust Zitouni and place Said in his place. Both Tajeen and Lamara were executed the following day. The entire taped “confession” is available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kB3xN5_Ntqk (accessed February 5, 2016).
 77. Willis (see note 46), 353.
 78. See *al-Hayat*, February 7, 1996.
 79. *Agence France Presse International (AFPI)*, January 21, 1996. The FIS and AIS continued to accuse the GIA and former GIA militias of attacking their activists (see *al-Hayat*, February 7, 1996 and May 7, 1998).
 80. According to Chikhi (see note 50), the leadership “spread an atmosphere of fear and suspicion in the ranks of the GIA, so much so that we stopped trusting one another. No one dared to speak out and voice a differing opinion.” The leadership prevented its fighters from listening to the radio or reading newspapers. Critical *fatwas* by venerable Salafist scholars from home and abroad were kept secret. Ali Benhadjar, a former GIA commander that split in 1997, stated that the GIA “bumped off some fighters just because they were listening to a cassette of Abassi Madani or Ali Benhadj speaking.” See El Kadi Ihsane, *Benhadjar Sets Record Straight on Internecine GIA*, December 17, 2001, http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/2001/benhadjar_gia.htm (accessed March 8, 2017). Abu Musab al-Suri, who was one of the leading supporters of the GIA in London, lamented how he began to hear stories that his books as well as those of other jihadists were no longer permitted because they contained rationalist influences in them. See Umar Abdelhakim (Abu Musab al-Suri), *My Brief Testimony Regarding the Jihad in Algeria, 1988–1996*, June 1, 2004, <http://rachad.tv/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/omar-abdelhakim-on-algeria-gia-ar.pdf> (accessed June 7, 2017), 22.
 81. GIA communiqué #35 in *al-Ansar*, newsletter no. 101, June 15, 1995.
 82. For a comprehensive list of the battalions that split from the GIA, see *al-Hayat*, March 23, 1996. By 1997, the GIA had splintered into at least seven factions according to a leaked Algerian security services report. See *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, February 24, 1997.
 83. Interview with *al-Hayat*, February 8, 2000.
 84. By 1997, there were an estimated 150,000 militiamen around the country, including in Islamist strongholds. See Luis Martinez, “Les enjeux des négociations entre l’AIS et l’armée,” *Politique Étrangère* 62, no. 4 (Winter 1997/98): 499–510, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” *Rationality and Society* 11, no. 3 (1999): 243–85.
 85. For a comprehensive list of massacres, see Jacob Mundy, “‘Wanton and Senseless’ Revisited: The Study of Warfare in Civil Conflicts and the Historiography of the Algerian Massacres,” *African Studies Review* 56, no. 3 (2013): 25–55.
 86. Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (New York: Routledge), 124.
 87. Ibid.
 88. S. Mohamed, “Mezraq’s Followers Continue Their Attacks Against the GIA,” *Al-Khabar* (Algiers), October 19, 1997.

89. Abdallah Anas, one of the few Algerian Afghans to remain on the FIS's Executive Committee after 1992, acknowledged that the GIA's violence had driven up popular support for Algeria's General Liamine Zeroual during his successful bid for the presidency in the November 1995 elections. See *al-Hayat*, December 9, 1995.
90. Low estimate comes from Martinez (see note 65), 215; the high estimate comes from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*, April 2005. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2017).
91. Martinez (see note 84), 162.
92. Ibid., 149.
93. Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Routledge 2004), 187.
94. Martinez (see note 65), 92–3.
95. Jeremy Shapiro, "France and the GIA," in *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, edited by Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 133–66.
96. Camille Tawil, *Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa'ida and the Arab Jihadists* (London: Dar Al-Saqi, 2010).
97. Roman Hagelstein, "Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War," March 2008, <http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wp43.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2017).
98. Miriam R. Lowri, "Algeria, 1992–2002: Anatomy of a Civil War," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1 Africa*, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), 226.
99. Martinez (see note 65), 212–3.
100. Ihsane (see note 81).
101. In addition to several studies cited earlier (see notes 29, 31–35, and 37), also see Juan E. Ugarriza and Matthew J. Craig, "The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in Colombia," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 3 (2012): 445–77; Paul Staniland, "Milicias, Ideology, and the State," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 770–93; Nam Kyu Kim, "Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2016); Kentaro Hirose, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, "Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Insurgent Violence? Ideology and Insurgent Tactical Choice in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 47–63; Laia Balcells, *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Reed M. Wood and Jakana L. Thomas, "Women on the Frontline: Rebel Group Ideology and Women's Participation in Violent Rebellion," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 31–46.
102. See Sebastian J. Walsh, "Killing Post-Almohad Man: Malek Bennabi, Algerian Islamism and the Search for a Liberal Governance," *The Journal of North African Studies* 12, no. 2 (2007): 235–54.
103. Martinez (see note 65), 215.
104. Martinez (see note 84), 503.
105. Peter Kenyon, "Terror Group Entrenched in Algeria," *National Public Radio*, August 14, 2008. His estimate is of the GSPC fighters, which are counted here as GIA members because they were so before the split.
106. This figure is derived from the high estimate by Kenyon (Ibid.) and data on 800 surrendering GIA rebels (see *al-Hayat*, January 12 and 20, 2000).
107. Martinez (see note 65), 215.
108. Martinez (see note 84), 503.
109. According to Algerian government figures, 4,200 AIS rebels agreed to abide by the ceasefire and took advantage of the general amnesty in 2000 (see *al-Hayat*, January 20, 2000).
110. Luis Martinez, "Why the Violence in Algeria," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 20.